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A vicarious experience is an empathetic
state in response to the observation of
others’ sensations, emotions, and actions
(Keysers and Gazzola, 2009). Vicarious
experiences in response to social stimuli
are quite common in the general healthy
population and they may even constitute
an important basis for social behavior.
Interestingly, vicarious experiences recruit
similar neural processes as the primary
experience of a certain sensation, emotion,
or action, and it is assumed that the mirror
neuron system is involved in these vicari-
ous neural processes (e.g., Morrison et al.,
2004; Singer et al., 2004; Jackson et al.,
2005).
Synesthesia denotes a condition that
leads to specific experiences in response
to normal sensory input that is not expe-
rienced by non-synesthetes. Synesthetic
experiences are characterized as idiosyn-
cratic, involuntarily elicited, and con-
sistent over time (Grossenbacher and
Lovelace, 2001; Ward, 2013; but see,
Simner, 2011). Synesthesia tends to run
in families suggesting a genetic compo-
nent and has a neural basis (Asher et al.,
2006, 2009; Barnett et al., 2008). The
best studied and most accepted form of
synesthesia is grapheme-color synesthe-
sia. People affected by this type of synes-
thesia experience colors for numbers and
letters printed in black on a white back-
ground (e.g., Rothen et al., 2012). On
a neural basis, it has been suggested
that brain regions concerned with bind-
ing processes, the modality of the induc-
ing stimulus, and the modality of the
respective sensory experience are involved
(e.g., Hubbard et al., 2011; Rouw et al.,
2011).
Recently, it has been suggested that
also vicarious experiences represent an
instance of synesthesia. In particular,
the term mirror-sensory synesthesia
has been introduced in the scientific
literature to describe instances of overt
phenomenological experiences reflecting
the actual state of an observed sensation
and/or emotion (i.e., a phenomeno-
logically overt vicarious experience,
Fitzgibbon et al., 2012b). It has been sug-
gested that people who report to have
explicit and consciously accessible expe-
riences of touch and/or pain upon the
observation of other people being touched
or in pain may be called mirror-touch
and mirror-pain synesthetes, respectively
(Fitzgibbon et al., 2010, 2012b). However,
other mirror-sensory forms, such as for
example mirror-disgust experiences, seem
possible.
Here, we argue that the label synes-
thesia should be reserved for canonical
cases of synesthesia (such as grapheme-
color or lexical-gustatory) and we outline
similarities and differences between
synesthesia and vicarious experiences
(Table 1) (for the use of the term synes-
thesia see also, Deroy and Spence, 2013).
By using the term mirrored sensory
experiences, we focus on phenomeno-
logically open instances of vicarious
experiences because as by the defini-
tion of “mirror-sensory synesthesia”
phenomenologically less overt forms
are not to be regarded as instances of
synesthesia.
Table 1 | Commonalities and differences between synesthesia and mirrored sensory
experiences.
Criterion Synesthesia Mirrored sensory experiences
Prevalence Rare Rare to frequent
Developmental trajectory Early, stable Late, variable
Neural basis Specific General
Bandwith Typically moderate Minimal
Consistency High Difficult to assess
Idiosyncrasy High Minimal
Genetic disposition Likely and special Likely but not special
Experience Conscious Often conscious
At a first glance, mirrored sensory
experiences and synesthesia seem to
share many features, but there are also
marked differences as already mentioned
by Fitzgibbon et al. (2012b). Thus, it is
open to debate whether mirrored sen-
sory experiences should be regarded as a
form of synesthetic experiences. In order
to keep the following critical comparison
of the two conditions straightforward, we
focus on grapheme-color synesthesia as a
well-established form of synesthesia.
For both conditions, the mirrored sen-
sor experience and synesthesia, there is
a clear relationship between an inducing
stimulus (i.e., inducer in the synesthe-
sia literature) and a resulting concurrent
experience (i.e., concurrent in the synes-
thesia literature). Specifically, this may
be the observation of touch for mir-
rored touch experiences and a letter
or number in grapheme-color synes-
thesia. In both cases the concurrent
experiences are triggered automatically
and involuntarily. Empirical evidence
can be found with variants of the
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), where
people experiencing mirrored touch
show slower reaction times and more
errors in reporting perceived touch
for incongruent instances of perceived
and observed touch in comparison
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to congruent instances of perceived and
observed touch (Banissy and Ward, 2007).
Similarly, grapheme-color synesthetes
show slower reaction times in real and
synesthetic color naming when presented
with graphemes incongruently colored
to their experiences in comparison to
graphemes congruently colored with their
experiences (e.g., Dixon et al., 2004; Ward
et al., 2007). However, these kind of Stroop
effects do not proof the genuine nature of
synesthetic experiences and can be found
in non-synesthete controls trained on
grapheme-color associations (e.g., Meier
and Rothen, 2009; Rothen et al., 2011;
Colizoli et al., 2012) or even swimming-
style color associations (Rothen et al.,
2013a).
Since synesthetic experiences are
idiosyncratic and consistent over time,
the gold-standard to establish synesthetic
experiences is to assess the consistency of
the inducer-concurrent relationship in a
test-retest procedure. Due to their con-
scious experiences, synesthetes generally
exhibit high test-retest consistency for
individual inducer-concurrent pairings,
but not so controls who have to rely solely
on memory (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al.,
1987; Eagleman et al., 2007). In contrast,
it is not possible to use the test of con-
sistency to mirrored sensory experiences
because there is only a minimal band-
width (i.e., one inducing stimulus such
as observed touch or pain for individual
forms of mirrored experiences only) and
thus, there is no variability in the mirrored
experience. Moreover and importantly,
the vicarious experience is identical to the
inducing stimulus (which is identical to
the observed experience).
While the concept of bandwidth (Asher
et al., 2006) did not receive much atten-
tion in the synesthesia literature, we are
not aware of any form of synesthesia which
bandwidth is theoretically limited to only
one inducer. However, this seems to be
the case for the different forms of mir-
rored sensory experiences (i.e., mirrored
touch and mirrored pain). The fact that
different levels of intensity of touch or
pain, respectively, may or may not induce
a mirrored experience has more to do with
the associated characteristics of the spe-
cific stimulus than actually representing
different stimuli (but see, Fitzgibbon et al.,
2012b).
The lack of variability (and conse-
quentially lack of categorical organization)
in mirrored sensory experiences prevents
individual forms of mirrored sensory
experiences from sharing with established
forms of synesthesia the core criterion of
idiosyncratic inducer-concurrent pairings.
That is, while A may elicit a red color
experience for one grapheme-color synes-
thete, it may elicit a blue color experience
for another grapheme-color synesthete
(Grossenbacher and Lovelace, 2001). In
contrast, mirrored sensory experiences
seem rather systematic than idiosyncratic
(for the use of “systematic” in relation
to crossmodal correspondences or “weak
synesthesia” see, Martino and Marks,
2001). That is, observed soft touch would
result in perceived soft touch and observed
strong touch would result in perceived
strong touch.
The fact that the mirrored sensory
experience is identical to the experience
of the inducing stimulus constitutes a
marked difference between mirrored sen-
sory experiences and established forms
of synesthesia, for which the inducer-
concurrent relationship is typically some-
what arbitrary and idiosyncratic (but see,
Rich et al., 2005; Simner et al., 2005). Due
to this characteristic of mirrored sensory
experiences, theymay bemore comparable
to the hypothetical form of, for example,
grapheme–grapheme synesthesia in which
specific graphemes would elicit an experi-
ence of the very same grapheme in front
of the mind’s eye of the perceiver or pro-
jected in the space between the inducing
grapheme and the eyes of the perceiver—
two subtypes that exist in grapheme-color
synesthesia described as associator and
projector, respectively (Dixon et al., 2004;
Ward et al., 2007).
As mentioned earlier, mirrored sen-
sory experiences have a neural basis which
is quite different from that of synes-
thesia. Mirrored experiences are thought
to be associated with activity in mirror-
neurons which respond not only to an
action, sensation, or emotion but also
to the observation of the same or a
similar action, sensation, or emotion.
Mirror-neurons can be found in various
different regions of the brain (Keysers and
Gazzola, 2009). Mirrored touch and pain
experiences are supposed to be associ-
ated with activity of mirror-neurons in
the somatosensory cortex and the insula
(Blakemore et al., 2005; Osborn and
Derbyshire, 2010). Hence, mirrored expe-
riences seem to reflect intramodal activity.
In contrast, synesthesia seems to reflect
explicitly experienced crossmodal activity.
That is, synesthesia is associated with brain
activity not only related to the inducer but
also to the respective specific concurrent
(i.e., as if it were sensory in its nature).
In grapheme-color synesthesia, these are
a grapheme-sensitive region and human
color area (hV4) both located in the
region of the fusiform gyrus. Moreover,
there seem parietal binding mechanisms
involved which are thought to underlie the
integration of the inducer and concurrent
experience (e.g., Rothen et al., 2010; Rouw
et al., 2011).
Hence, mirrored experiences seem to
be lying on a continuum with vicarious
experiences more generally. Indeed, vicar-
ious experiences in the general popula-
tion are found to activate similar brain
areas as mirrored experiences and mirror
experiences are found to activate similar
brain regions as the respective perceived
experience. Collectively, there is increas-
ing evidence for vicarious, mirrored,
and real experiences of pain and touch,
respectively to have a common neural
basis associated with insular, somatosen-
sory, and cingulate cortex activation (e.g.,
Morrison et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004;
Blakemore et al., 2005; Jackson et al., 2005;
Keysers and Gazzola, 2009; Osborn and
Derbyshire, 2010). Interestingly, also in
non-synesthetes interactions between sys-
tems for perceiving and observing touch
can be found. That is, sub-threshold stim-
ulation is more likely to be perceived by
observing touch to own face than others
faces or inanimate objects (Serino et al.,
2008). In contrast, the presence/absence
of synesthesia seems to reflect a bimodal
distribution (Rothen et al., 2013b).
Accordingly, mirrored experiences have
been interpreted as the result of an over-
active mirror system (Blakemore et al.,
2005; Fitzgibbon et al., 2012b). This would
be in line with the notion that mirrored
experiences are an extreme characteris-
tic of an otherwise normal somatosen-
sory experience on the same continuum
(Fitzgibbon et al., 2012b). The relative
high incidence (i.e., 30%) of mirrored pain
within the general population (Osborn
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and Derbyshire, 2010) is also suggestive
that mirrored experiences are rather nor-
mal. In contrast, mirrored touch expe-
riences seem to be more special as the
prevalence was estimated to be around
1.6% (Banissy et al., 2009). In addition, an
association between enhanced self-rated
empathy in people who experience mir-
rored pain (Osborn and Derbyshire, 2010)
and mirrored touch (Banissy and Ward,
2007; but for mirrored pain and empathy
in amputees see, Fitzgibbon et al., 2012a)
further supports the notion of mirrored
sensory experiences as being rather normal
experiences on a somatosensory contin-
uum that might be based on empathetic
abilities.
Mirrored sensory experiences (i.e., mir-
rored touch and mirrored pain) seem to
be very similar to socially contagious phe-
nomena such as laughter (Provine, 1992),
yawning (Provine, 1989; Platek et al.,
2003), and itching (Holle et al., 2012).
Watching someone laughing can induce
a feeling of happiness and put a smile
or laugh on the face of the perceiver,
watching someone yawning can induce a
yawning in the perceiver, and watching
someone scratching himself can induce a
feeling of itchiness and may lead to the
perceiver scratching himself. That is, there
is always an inducing stimulus and always
a concurrent experience/action. The con-
current experience is elicited automati-
cally, but there is no idiosyncrasy because
the concurrent experience is not gener-
ally organized in categories. Furthermore,
there is also a social component asso-
ciated with the inducing stimulus (i.e.,
someone is being perceived doing some-
thing) which does not exist for classical
forms of synesthesia, but for mirrored sen-
sory experiences. Hence, mirrored sensory
experiences may belong to the same cate-
gory of experiences as socially contagious
phenomena which in turn would follow
the same continuum as mirrored expe-
riences. Accordingly, it would be inter-
esting to see whether people who are
generally more prone to socially con-
tagious phenomena also exhibit higher
self-rated empathy (but see, Holle et al.,
2012).
Evidence for the similarity between
mirrored sensory experiences and socially
contagious phenomena can be found
on a neural basis. Exactly as mirrored
sensory experiences are socially conta-
gious phenomena based on mirror neu-
ron activity and do in fact elicit similar
brain activity in the perceiving person
as well as the in the observing per-
son (Holle et al., 2012). Accordingly, as
used throughout the article, we suggest
the terminology “mirrored sensory experi-
ence” as a subgroup of socially contagious
vicarious phenomena instead of “mirror-
sensory synesthesia” as a subgroup of
synesthesia.
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